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ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: A LEGAL FICTION
OLIVIA LJUBANOVIC*
ABSTRACT
This article challenges the immutability of legal professional privilege
and adopts, as its focus, the profound impact of Lord Taylor’s aphorism in R
v. Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex Parte B.1 By affirming the absoluteness of
legal professional privilege this decision, made at the highest level of the
English judicial system, placed the nature of legal professional privilege
beyond doubt.2 In drawing out the fallible judicial pronouncement, this
article argues that the ruling amounts to a legal fiction and concludes that the
twentieth century incarnation of the principle has evolved into a rigid rule
carrying a far greater certainty than historically intended.
Utilising Jeremy Bentham and John Henry Wigmore to inform the
debate, this article notes that the continuing significance of these preeminent
scholars lay in the fact that they, unlike their predecessors, adopted a broad
view of the subject of evidence. Together they pioneered a homogenous
intellectual tradition in which their thinking was instrumental to the way in
which the privilege evolved and infiltrated judicial thinking. Accordingly,
this article analyses how their respective philosophies shaped Derby’s
sweeping pronouncement.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to limit the breadth of legal professional privilege, or in the
alternative abolish its application altogether, Bentham and Wigmore
represent the ideal starting point for discerning the parameters in which the
privilege does, or should, operate. As a single privilege whose sub-headings
are “legal advice privilege” and “litigation privilege”, legal professional
privilege encompasses communications passing for the giving or receiving of
legal advice between solicitor and client and for communications made in

* Olivia Ljubanovic is a Doctor of Law. She holds a PhD from the University of Adelaide.
** The author wishes to thank Professor Paul Babie and Mr. David Caruso for their assistance and insight
during the preparation of this article.
1. [1996] AC 487 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
2. R v. Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex Parte B (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 48 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (noting that “the court will not permit, let alone order, the attorney to reveal the confidential
communications which have passed between him and his former client. His mouth is shut forever.”)
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anticipation of adversarial proceedings.3 Historically, the latter has been
limited to the curial setting, with any extension beyond the field of litigation
carefully restricted.4
Depicted as a standard by which to measure lawyerly conduct in a given
situation, legal professional privilege remains relevant today for its ability to
guarantee a measure of trust between solicitor and client, while presenting the
potential to withhold inculpatory evidence from courtrooms.5 Juxtaposing
the legal profession’s quest “to narrow the gap between . . . professional ideals
[with] competing realities,”6 legal professional privilege has attracted its
share of criticism over the course of its lifetime. The privilege has faced
opposition in all quarters, with a number of commentators and courts
questioning whether the privilege necessitated a permanent status.7 Its most
prominent detractor, Jeremy Bentham, attacked both the rule and the efficacy
of the common law. Viewing the common law as a living organism capable
of adjusting and adapting to the needs of society as they unfolded over time,
Bentham contended that the common law was not an “absolutely fixed,
inflexible system”8 and “precedents are not of absolute authority.”9 He
asserted that judicial decisions in one age were disregarded in another.10 It
naturally follows that legal professional privilege, as a bastion of the common
law, could not be of a permanently fixed character either.
This Benthamic pronouncement has been a recurrent theme in legal
opinion and it is doubtful that the privilege “[did] very much to promote
candour on the part of the client to his [lawyer].”11 It has been argued by
members of the judiciary12 that when a precedent was the only argument
“made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule’s creator to
destroy it.”13 Wigmore similarly labelled legal professional privilege
3. Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL
48, at ¶ 10 (HL).
4. Id. at ¶ 88.
5. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶¶ 72-73.
6. Rosalie Silberman Abella, Justice, Court of Appeal for Ont., Opening Address at the Law
Society of Upper Canada Benchers’ Retreat: Professionalism Revisited (Oct. 14, 1999).
7. See, e.g., O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Comm’rs (1983) 153 CLR 1 at ¶ 45 (Austl.) (holding
that the nature of the privilege should be “closely confined.”).
8. JEREMY BENTHAM, CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW: LETTER OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
AND REPORT OF JUDGES STORY, METCALF AND OTHERS 29-30 (1882).
9. Id. at 48.
10. Id.
11. O’Reilly, (1983) 153 CLR 1 at ¶ 44.
12. Justice Black was in the minority in the 1948 case, Francis v Southern Pacific Company,
wherein he stated that precedents should be destroyed when there was no justification to adhere to them,
aside from the fact they were court-made rules. Francis v S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948). Justice
Mason was in the majority in O’Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria, when he stated that
the benefits of the privilege were doubtful. O’Reilly (1983) 153 CLR 1 at ¶ 45. Lord Brougham also stated
that nothing imbued with the character of permanence could retain public respect.
13. Francis, 333 U.S. at 471.
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anomalous, plagued by obstacles and indeterminate benefits.14 Indeed,
Bentham’s most important successor, Wigmore, went so far as to label his
predecessor “the greatest opponent of [all the] privileges.”15 He stated that
no one aside from Bentham has “taken such an uncompromising stance
against all types of rigid formality and regulation in adjudication[s],”16 yet
both scholars shared similar sentiments about the privilege and assigned the
highest priority to rectitude of decision in adjudication.
It is clear that by his own measure, Wigmore would never have endorsed
a blanket application of the rule. Instead, he affirmed that the privilege should
be abrogated where it served a higher public interest, for in the end, the needs
of man were more important than blind adherence to a rule.17 In his
estimation, the privilege “is worth preserving for the sake of general policy,”
although “it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth.”18
Where Wigmore expressed the opinion that legal professional privilege
should be “strictly [construed] within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle,”19 Lord Taylor CJ emphasised a different
ideology in Derby.20
Producing a radical break with the predominant tradition, the harsh and
uncompromising stance taken by the House of Lords eliminated the
possibility to carry out an objective analysis to assess what a party had done.21
By restraining itself from inquiring into a party’s affairs, the Derby court
placed the client in the novel position of being beyond the reach of the law.
To borrow a Benthamism, the court effectively excused itself from rendering
service to justice by virtue of the fact that it could no longer discern the
parameters of the rule.
II.

DERBY: A FALLIBLE PRONOUNCEMENT
A. The ‘Absoluteness’ Justification

In assessing the extent to which the House of Lords’ ruling departed from
the rationales of Bentham and Wigmore, it is first necessary to revisit the facts
giving rise to R v Derby Magistrates’ Court; Ex Parte B.22 This proceeding
14. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW 3364 (1905).
15. Id. at 3364.
16. WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 27 (1985).
17. Id. at 161.
18. Wigmore, supra note 14, at 3204.
19. Id.
20. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 58 (noting that the legal profession “is a fundamental condition on
which the administration of justice as a whole rests.”).
21. Id. at ¶ 63 (holding that the privilege “has applied across the board in every case, irrespective
of the client’s individual merits.”).
22. Id. at ¶ 5.
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centred on two consolidated appeals from the Queen’s Bench division to the
appellate court, constituted by Lords Taylor CJ, Lloyd, Nicholls, Keith, and
Mustill.23 The case raised significant questions concerning the scope of legal
professional privilege and section 97 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980
(UK), which empowered the court to demand production of evidence
concerning the murder, by A, of a teenage girl.24
1.

Derby Magistrates’ Court: The Facts

A confessed to and was charged with her murder.25 He later recanted his
statement and claimed that his stepfather, Brooks, was the killer.26 A was
acquitted and his stepfather charged.27 During Brooks’ committal hearing,
the prosecution called A as a witness, at which time he was examined about
confidential client-counsel communications regarding his original 1978
confession and subsequent inconsistent accounts.28 A asserted legal
professional privilege to excuse himself giving evidence; however, the
stipendiary magistrate, Rougier J, adopted the test formulated in R v Barton29
and R v Ataou30 when he ruled that the documents in question were not
subject to legal professional privilege.31
In R v Barton,32 Caulfield J enunciated, in Benthamic fashion, that he
“cannot conceive that [the] law would permit a [lawyer] or other [individual]
to screen from the jury information which, if disclosed . . . [might] enable a
[defendant] . . . to establish his innocence or resist an allegation [advanced]
by the Crown.”33 The reasoning of Caulfield J is of a convincing nature and
was central to Bentham’s own contention for abrogating the privilege
altogether.34 Espousing a broad exception to the rule, Caulfield J held that a
proportionality test applied in which the privilege must yield if innocence is
at stake and information might enable the defendant to prove his innocence.35
In making this distinction, Caulfield J championed a balancing approach to
the privilege.36 While failing to enunciate any authority for this proposition,

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 3-4.
Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 5, 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
(1972) 2 All ER 1192, 1194 (Eng.).
(1988) QB 798 (Eng.).
Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 32.
R v Barton, (1972) 2 All ER 1192, 1194 (Eng.).
Id.
BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 36.
Barton, (1972) 2 All ER at 1194.
Id.
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he claimed to derive the principle “from the rules of natural justice.”37 He
perceived that if privileged communications could assist a defendant in
establishing his innocence, this was sufficient ground for destroying the rule,
because it was a matter of public interest that no innocent man be convicted
of a crime.38 Barton remained good authority for 22 years and was mirrored
in R v Ataou,39 when French J endorsed the principle. French J refers to
Caulfield J confirming that legal professional privilege did not attach to
documents in the control or possession of a lawyer if they could aid the
defence of an accused man.40
In similar vein, the court in the 1981 Canadian judgment, Regina v.
Dunbar and Logan41 observed that the adage of “‘once privileged, always
privileged’”42 presented a danger in criminal proceedings if it screened from
the jury information which would benefit an accused.43 Martin, Lacourcière
and Robins JJA observed that “[n]o rule of policy requires the continued
existence of [legal professional] privilege in criminal cases . . . .”44
Furthermore, the privilege was not absolute if the client no longer had any
ground on which to assert a recognisable interest in protecting what the
privilege was sought for.45 If the privilege became spent, a balancing of
interests fell in favour of admitting communications.46
B. The House of Lords’ Formulation
Prior to forming its judgment, the Derby court deliberated the underlying
principles on which the doctrine was based.47 While a significant volume of
case law was considered, the starting point for the House of Lords was the
long history of legal professional privilege.48 Weaving references to the older
English authorities throughout,49 Derby explicated that legal professional
privilege was absolute, having been settled once and for all in the 16th
37. I. H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 327 (1999).
38. Barton, (1972) 2 All ER at 1194.
39. R v. Ataou, (1988) QB 798 (Eng.).
40. Barton, (1972) 2 All ER at 1194.
41. [1982] 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13.
42. Calcraft v. Guest, (1898) QB 759, 761 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
43. R v. Dunbar, [1982] 68 CCC (2d) 13, at ¶ 104.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also R v. Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 at [599] (N.Z.).
46. Id.
47. Derby, (1996) 1 AC 487 at ¶ 34.
48. Id.
49. See Berd v. Lovelace, [1577] 21 Eng. Rep. 62; Dennis v. Codrington, [1579] 21 Eng. Rep. 100;
Wilson v. Rastall, (1792) All ER Rep. 597, 597; Greenough v. Gaskell, (1883) All ER Rep. 767, 767;
Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, [1833] 39 Eng. Rep. 614, 96; Holmes v. Baddeley, [1844] 41 Eng.
Rep. 476, 476; Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, [1876] 2 Ch. D 646; Southwark and Vauxhall
Water Co. v. Quick, [1877] 3 QBD. 315, 315; Pearce v. Foster, [1885] 15 QBD 114, 114; Wheeler v. Le
Marchant, [1881] 17 Ch. D. 675, 675; Calcraft, (1898) All ER Rep. at 346.
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century.50 The court announced that upon the privilege being effected, the
lawyer’s mouth was shut forever.51 “[I]f a balancing exercise was ever
required in the case of legal professional privilege, it was performed once and
for all in the 16th century, and since then has applied across the board in every
case, irrespective of the client’s individual merits.”52
There are three problems with this reasoning; the first of which lies in the
fact that the 16th century privity of communication was justified not on legal
professional privilege, but on the tenets of oath and honour.53 None of the
16th century authorities, from Lee v. Markham54 and Breame v. Breame55 to
Windsor v. Umberville56 and Berd v. Lovelace,57 articulated the right of a
lawyer to avoid testimony as a result of invoking legal professional
privilege.58 It was merely their oath and honour that excused lawyers from
testifying.59
The second problem lies in the refrain that the lawyer’s mouth is shut
forever. This edict is not a sixteenth century manifestation. Rather, it is an
18th century pronouncement made by Buller J in Wilson v. Rastall.60 Wilson
declared the privilege absolute in very specific circumstances, with only three
classes of legal professionals entitled to invoke a claim of privilege.61 These
were counsel, solicitors, and attorneys.62 Indeed, the antecedents of Wilson
can be traced back to the medieval Bailiffs of Sheriff’s etc. Act63 which was
passed in 1413. This statute precluded sheriffs and under-sheriffs from acting
as attornati on behalf of clients.64
The third problem with the court’s contention was dictated by long lines
of contradictory precedent. Through acting in reliance on the weight of
50. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 41.
51. Id. at ¶ 58.
52. Id. at ¶ 63.
53. P. Brereton, Legal Professional Privilege, in 2 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN
LAW: COMMERCIAL COMMON LAW 131-32 (J.T. Gleeson et al. eds. 2013).
54. Lee v. Markham, (1569) Monro 375, 375.
55. Breame v. Breame, [1571] 21 Eng. Rep. 120; see also R. O. Bridgman, A DIGEST OF THE
REPORTED CASES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY IN ENGLAND AND
IRELAND AND OF THE RULES AND ORDERS OF THE SAME COURTS; FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
PRESENT TIME 178 (1829).
56. Windsor v. Umberville, (1574) Monro 411, 411.
57. Berd, [1577] 21 Eng. Rep. 62.
58. Brereton, supra note 53, at 131-32.
59. Id. (The House of Lords failed to note the fundamental differences between these court of
Chancery cases and the common law, whereby parties could be deposed to answer interrogatories).
60. (1792) All Eng. Rep. at 599. (“[T]he privilege never ceased at any period of time. In such a
case it is not sufficient to say that the cause is at an end; the mouth of such a person is shut for ever. I take
the distinction to be now well settled to the three enumerated cases”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Bailiffs of Sheriffs Shall Not Be in Office More Than One Year 1413Bailiff of Sheriff’s Act
etc. 1413, 1 Hen. 5 c. 3-6, § 4 (Eng.).
64. Id.
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authority stemming from Wilson when asserting the absoluteness of the rule,
the House of Lords overlooked the decisions which preceded or succeeded it,
including but not limited to, Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea.65 In that 1743
matter Lord Baron Bowes stated that upon a cause ending, only then was the
lawyer to be considered with respect to his former employer as one man to
another; in which case a breach of trust did not fall within the jurisdiction of
the Court for the Court cannot determine what is honour, only what is law.66
In 1753, Sir John Strange MR, in Winchester v. Fournier,67 commented
that while it was “a very right rule” that an attorney ought not to betray the
secrets of his clients, if “he himself [did] not object[] to it, the court has
nothing to do with it”.68 Proving historically significant for overruling the
Wilson v. Rastall69 pronouncement that a lawyer’s lips were forever sealed,70
Turquand v. Knight71 observed that the court would not enforce a lawyer to
obey the rule of legal professional privilege if he were not professionally
employed in the cause.72 In refusing to uphold the rule enunciated in Wilson,
Turquand signified that although Wilson might be amongst the most
frequently cited cases on the subject, it was not the final word with respect to
legal professional privilege. By the end of the 19th century, Lord Esher MR
in Marks v. Beyfus73 acknowledged that the public policy which says “an
innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be prove[n] is
the policy that must prevail.”74
Thus, where the Derby court erroneously claimed that they settled legal
professional privilege in the 16th century, it subsequently contradicted itself
by admitting that it was not until the 18th century that “[the rule] was . . . on
the way to being established on its present basis.”75 Prior to this era, the laws
of England often consisted of disconnected and scattered precedents.76 Even
Wigmore observed that ‘the period from 1790 to 1830 was “the full spring
tide of the system of rules of evidence,”77 where the principles of English law
“began to be developed into rules and precedents of minutiae relatively

65. Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, [1743] 21 Eng. Rep. 202.
66. Id.
67. [1753] 28 Eng. Rep. 445 (Eng.).
68. Winchester v. Fournier, [1753] 28 Eng. Rep. 445, 447 (Eng.).
69. (1792) All ER Rep 597 (Eng.).
70. Rastall, (1792) All ER Rep at 599-600.
71. [1836] 150 Eng. Rep. 685, 686 (Eng.).
72. Turquad v. Knight, 150 Eng. Rep. 685, 686 (Eng.) (privilege did not apply in this case because
the attorney was acting as a scrivener only.).
73. [1890] 25 QBD 494 (Eng.).
74. Marks v. Beyfus, 25 QBD 494, 498 (Eng.).
75. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶¶ 45, 63.
76. TWINING, supra note 16, at 1-2.
77. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 3196.
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innumerable in comparison with what had gone before.”78 He emphasised
that the changes to legal professional privilege “brought a residuum of trouble
and confusion into the precedents of the 1800s,” and stated that “the shackles
of the earlier precedents were not finally thrown off until the decade of
1870.”79
1.

Derby and the Modern Authorities

In addition to recognising the rule from its early English origins, the
House of Lords averted to modern precedents set in the Commonwealth
jurisdictions of Australia,80 Canada,81 New Zealand,82 and South Africa.83
Collectively, these seminal cases contributed to the modern-day approach to
legal professional privilege. The first of these examined is the 1976
Australian case, Grant v Downs,84 which required the High Court “to
determine and state the relevant [legal professional privilege] principle to
operate in Australia”85
Barwick CJ commented that “no such statement of authority” presently
bound the courts in this country.86 Although the Grant court noted the
necessity of the privilege with the majority stating that its existence was “so
firmly entrenched in the law that it [could] not . . . be exorcised by judicial
decision,”87 they cautioned that powerful considerations suggested that the
privilege should be strictly contained.88 The court labelled it more of “an
impediment, not an inducement, to frank testimony [which] detract[ed] from
the fairness of the trial by denying a party access to relevant documents or at
least subjecting him to surprise.”89 Through confining the application of the
78. JOHN WIGMORE & COLIN MCNAUGHTON, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, Vol. X, §
8, 60g. (1961).
79. Id.
80. Grant v Downs [1976] 135 CLR 674 (29 November 1976) (Austl.); Baker v Campbell [1983]
153 CLR 52 (26 October 1983) (Austl.).
81. Dunbar, [1982] 68 CCC 13 (Can.).
82. Craig, [1975] 1 NZLR 597 (N.Z.).
83. S. v. Safatsa 1987 SA 242/1986 (CC).
84. [1976] 135 CLR 674, 679 (29 November 1976) (Austl.). In Grant, the question that came to be
decided before the Court centred on whether certain medical records, relating to the type and nature of
injuries sustained by patients in mental hospitals, were exempt from discovery on the basis that they
attracted the privilege. The deceased, Neville William John Grant, had been an inpatient at North Ryde
Psychiatric Centre when, during an unsupervised period, he escaped from his room overnight and died
from exposure to cold. Outlining the material purposes for which the documents were brought into
existence, Wilfred James Maundrell, an officer of the Health Commission of New South Wales cited
several reasons as necessitating exclusion from inspection; namely: disciplinary action against staff,
coronial proceedings and the possibility of a civil suit for damages.
85. Grant, 135 CLR at 677.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 685.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 686.
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privilege to documents solely created for the purpose of legal advice or use
in litigation, the High Court restrained the privilege from “travel[ling] beyond
the underlying rationale to which it is intended to give expression”.90 In
simple terms, if the privilege’s sweep is too broad, the search for the truth is
compromised because a greater number of justifications would exist to shield
communications from discovery.
The second Australian case considered by the House of Lords was Baker
v Campbell,91 in which Mason J indicated that it was “by no means selfevident” that legal professional privilege was superior to the “public interest
in facilitating the availability of all relevant materials for production in
litigious disputes.”92 Indeed, the court recognised that the ability to compel
disclosure of professional confidences carried significant consequences
because it curtailed the judicial search for truth.93
In a 4:3 judgment, the majority overruled Grant when they held that
documents were exempt from search and seizure, thus subject to a claim of
privilege.94 The view articulated by Wilson J was particularly significant
because, in it, he acknowledged that he had finally “arrived at the only result
which afford[ed him] lasting satisfaction”.95 Wilson J conceded that he had
been plagued by “much anxious thought, in the course of which [his] opinion
. . . fluctuated from one conclusion to another.”96 Finally, he resolved that
“[t]he perfect administration of justice is not limited to legal proceedings.”97
He deferred to Wigmore when he opined that the privilege was an essential
mark of a free society which attached to the relationship between lawyer and
client.98
In the South African appeal case of S. v. Safatsa,99 Botha JA, on
delivering the judgment of the court, criticised the Baker ruling when he
cautioned, “that any claim to . . . relax[] the privilege . . . [should] be
approached with the greatest circumspection.100 He could not fathom how
judges could otherwise be called upon to carry out any form of balancing
exercise with respect to the privilege by weighing the conflicting principles

90. Grant, 135 CLR at 688.
91. [1983] 153 CLR 52 (26 October 1983) (Austl.).
92. Baker, 153 CLR at 75.
93. Id. at 69.
94. Id. at 70.
95. Id. at 93.
96. Id. at 93.
97. Baker, 153 CLR at 95.
98. Id.
99. 1987 SA 242/1986 (CC). The Court was constituted by Botha JA, Hefer JA, Smalberger JA,
Boshoff AJA and MT Steyn AJA. Id.
100. Safatsa 1987 S.A. 242-1986 (CC) at 55.
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of public policy without being supplied information relevant to the issue in
question.101
These latter cases considered by Derby provide a strongly consistent view
of the nature and scope of the privilege as it evolved in each of the aforementioned jurisdictions.102 The central principles derived from the
Commonwealth authorities overwhelmingly support the proposition that the
privilege is not unqualified. In fact, this theme was argued by Goldberg QC,
for the respondent, who submitted that the balance between competing
interests should not be snuffed out.103 He prevailed upon the Derby court to
weigh each case individually rather than apply an ‘all or nothing’ approach.104
By attaching equal importance to any prejudice suffered by clients as a
result of disclosure and prejudices faced by the accused through nondisclosure, Goldberg Q.C. advocated in favour of a balancing test whereby
the privilege could be breached only in truly exceptional circumstances.105
The phrase truly exceptional circumstances was not defined in the case.
Asserting that “times have changed,” he argued that greater emphasis was
now being placed on putting courts in “possession of all relevant material, in
order to arrive at the truth.”106 Goldberg’s contention may arguably be an
allusion to Bentham who maintained that the primary virtue of legal
professional privilege lies in the fact that it was a mechanism behind which a
guilty party could conceal their misdeeds.107
2.

The Weight of Authority

However, the decision promulgated by the House of Lords went against
the weight of authority espoused in the Commonwealth jurisdictions when it
resolved “the clash of principles . . . in favour of the paramountcy of [the
rule.]”108 The Derby court did not view the privilege as a question of
balancing the interests of Brooks against A, despite Brooks’ interest in not
being wrongfully convicted outweighing A’s interest in not being convicted
of a crime for which he had previously been acquitted.109 The consequence

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 56.
Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶¶ 76-78.
Id. at ¶ 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 69.
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE PART TWO (1838), reprinted in 7 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 474 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
108. Michael Bowes, The Supremacy of Legal Professional Privilege: The Derby Magistrates Case,
1996 Arch. News 4, 8 (1996).
109. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶¶ 79-80.
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for A, while unfortunate, was not as unpalatable as the prospect of an innocent
person being falsely imprisoned.110
Substantially departing from precedent, Lord Taylor CJ, in his summary,
announced that Barton and Ataou had been wrongly decided and ought to be
overruled due to the overriding importance of the privilege.111 The logical
question is whether the justification for legal professional privilege has been
undermined in the intervening years between Barton and Derby.112 It is
critical, at this juncture, to note that the respective judicial pronouncements
of Caulfield and French JJ survived unchallenged for decades. Throughout
this period, their respective rulings caused no damage to the integrity of the
justice system, nor did they undermine or impair the functioning of the
broader legal system. In light of this, it is possible to rebut the presumption
that damage would arise from a limited exception to the rule.
The House of Lords contended that Craig was similarly flawed and
speculated that the no ‘recognisable interest’ argument must have been raised
in numerous cases in which the privilege was upheld despite the client ceasing
to have grounds for asserting a claim, yet it was never suggested that this
might make a difference.113 It has subsequently been stated that “as long as
the rule is based on its present premises and is accepted as being for its present
purpose, the rule must be accepted as absolute. There can be no half-way
house (to accommodate, for example, the witness without a ‘recognisable
interest’)”.114
Of Dunbar and Logan, the Derby court stated that the notion of weighing
competing interests was unacceptable on the basis that a client may have an
ongoing interest in non-disclosure which could be outweighed by another
interest if the court, in its discretion, overrode the rule.115 Applying this
reasoning to the present case, Lord Nicholls stated that no rational person, on
finding themselves in the circumstances with which Brooks was confronted,
would seek to maintain confidentiality; however as A was acquitted, A
remained entitled to claim the privilege as a means of refusing to divulge
communications which would infer guilt.116
With respect to the Australian authorities, the House of Lords
concentrated on a singular quote in Grant, specifically that legal professional
110. Id. at ¶ 80.
111. Id. at ¶ 65.
112. Privilege - Prosecution Witness Acquitted of Offence Of Which Defendant Later Charged Defence Seeking to Question Witness as to Original Instructions To Legal Advisers Admitting Offence,
190 CRIM L. REV. 193 (1996).
113. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 68.
114. J.A. Coutts, House of Lords: Evidence of Instructions to Legal Advisers, 60 J. CRIM. L. 176,
179-80 (1996).
115. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 84.
116. Id.
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privilege promoted the public interest by facilitating the representation of
clients by legal advisers and was so firmly entrenched that it could not be
exorcised by judicial decision.117 The Derby court disregarded all references
to the sole purpose test in which Grant adopted a narrow scope of the rule, so
as not to compromise the search for truth by shielding from discovery a
greater number of communications. Furthermore, the Grant court cautioned
that the privilege should be strictly construed on the basis that it impeded
frank testimony and diminished fairness by denying a party access to relevant
documents.118
While the House of Lords appears to have been persuaded by the
reasoning in Baker, Lord Taylor CJ described legal professional privilege as
being “a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a
whole rests,”119 he conceded that where litigation was not anticipated, it was
difficult to justify why communications between client and lawyer should be
privileged.120 In seeking to apply his “absoluteness” justification to legal
professional privilege only in the context of litigation, Lord Taylor saw no
value in extending it to legal advice.121 Thus, if advice was not sought in
anticipation of litigation then such advice was not privileged. Lord Taylor
claimed there would be little to fear if the privilege was not available under
these circumstances, for client-counsel communications would not be
inhibited.122 In delimiting the privilege in this manner, Lord Taylor CJ also
left the door open for a “future harm” exception.123
The Derby court touched briefly on Safatsa when recognising the need to
exert caution over any claim to relax the privilege; however, Lord Taylor CJ
ultimately formed the opinion that “no exception should be allowed to the
absolute nature of the rule once established.”124 He borrowed from Lord
Brougham in Greenough v Gaskell125 when he concluded: “it is not for the
sake of the applicant alone that the privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider
interests of all those who might otherwise be deterred from telling the whole
truth to their solicitors.”126
117. Id. at ¶ 75 (quoting Grant, [1976] 135 CLR at 685.
118. Grant, [1976] 135 CLR at 685.
119. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 58.
120. Id. at ¶ 61 (noting that “[n]obody doubts that legal professional privilege could be modified, or
even abrogated, by statute, subject always to the objection that legal professional privilege is a fundamental
human right protection by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights . . . .”).
121. Id. at ¶ 65.
122. Id. at ¶ 62.
123. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 65 (emphasising the amicus curaie argument that “[t]here might be occasions, if
only by way of rare exception, in which the rule should yield to some other consideration of even greater
importance.”)
124. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 65.
125. Greenough, (1883) All ER Rep at 770.
126. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 65.
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Although Lord Taylor CJ observed that the privilege was integral to the
administration of justice, the rule should not be understood as being the sole
ingredient in the whole recipe for justice or the cornerstone upon which the
legal profession was built. Indeed, a number of other pillars are equally
integral to the administration of justice; these include trust, competence,
ethical and professional conduct, integrity, and efficacy of the legal
profession.127 While Lords Keith and Mustill concurred with the Chief
Justice and added nothing further to his pronouncement, Lord Nicholls noted
the tension between the doctrine of legal professional privilege and the public
interest, when he countenanced that: “all relevant material should be available
to courts when deciding cases. Courts should not have to reach decisions in
ignorance of the contents of documents or other material which, if disclosed,
might well affect the outcome.”128
On one reading of it, it appears that Lord Nicholls opposed an absolutist
approach to the privilege; however, on a closer reading it becomes evident
that he rejected the idea of a balancing test because it would present the court
with an impossible task.129 He concluded that, in the absence of any measure
by which judges could ascribe an appropriate weight to civil and criminal
actions of differing severity,130 the prospect of such an exercise was
illusory.131
Derby therefore represents a change from treating legal professional
privilege as a rule of admissibility which was the view a generation ago, to
the modern view initially taken in Australia in Baker, that the principle
constituted a fundamental right. A fundamental human right is defined as
“[the] freedoms [accorded] equally and without distinction to each and every
human being.”132 In the context of legal professional privilege however, the
important principle underpinning this ‘fundamental right’ rests in the public
interest in enabling clients to speak to their lawyers in confidence without
fear of ever having those conversations exposed or subjected to scrutiny.133
Despite the prevalence of doubt that the privilege did “very much to
promote candour on the part of the client to his [lawyer],”134 the Derby court
proved that the common law now classed the privilege as a fundamental asset
which had morphed into “an important common law immunity.”135 While
127. Vance v McCormack [2004] 184 FLR 62, at ¶ 42.
128. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 73.
129. Id.
130. Id. at ¶ 80.
131. Id. at ¶ 81.
132. Human Right, DUHAIME’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/H/
HumanRight.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
133. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 58.
134. O’Reilly, 153 CLR at 44.
135. Daniels Corp. Int’l Pty Ltd v Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm’n [2002] HCA 1, ¶ 11.
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recognising that the refusal of A to reveal secrets wrought grave harm upon
Brooks, the decision not to compel A’s confidential communications went
against Lord Taylor’s efforts to satisfy the judicial conscience. Contrary to
his desire to leave no pebble unturned, Lord Taylor’s Derby pronouncement
was distinct from the earlier judgments over which he presided.136
In
R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex p. Taylor (No. 1),137 Lord Taylor
concurred with Nicholls LJ that it would be unwise to “say anything which
might be thought to tie the hands of the judge.”138 This case evidenced that
the boundaries of legal professional privilege were not always clearly drawn,
and the court went so far as to admit that the correct answer eluded them.139
Where that court conceded that in future cases a different outcome may
commend itself to the judiciary when examining legal professional privilege
in a clearer light, this was at odds with the Derby judgment which effectively
bound and gagged the judiciary from engaging in any form of balancing
exercise.140
In Balabel v Air India,141 Lord Taylor criticised cases which extended the
doctrine without limit to all communications.142 This evidences that, in
limiting the breadth of the principle, Balabel succeeded in developing a firm
rule.
Lord Taylor’s judgment in R v. Umoh Mfongbong143 also aligned with
Benthamic and Wigmorean pronouncements in confirming that legal
professional privilege should remain a preserve of the legal profession.144
Lord Taylor denied protection to communications passing between prisoner
and prison officer where the latter was acting in the capacity of a legal aid
officer.145 With respect to waiver of privileged communications, Lord Taylor
passed two conflicting rulings. In Tanap v. Tozer,146 he remained faithful to
Wigmore’s philosophy that the dictates of fairness required full disclosure on
the basis that a party to a proceeding should not be permitted to “cherry pick”
which portions of a privileged communication they wished to divulge against
those they wished to guard from disclosure.147 Conversely, in Goldman v.
Hesper,148 he again recognised that the privilege is not absolute and
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Balabel v. Air India (1988) Ch 317 at 331 (Eng.).
R v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs; Ex Parte Taylor, [1989] 1 All ER 906.
Id. at 917-18.
See id. at 917.
See id. at 917-18; Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 63.
Balabel, (1988) Ch at 331.
Id.
R v. Umoh, [1987] 84 Cr. App. R. 138, 143.
Id.
Id.
Tanap Investments (UK) v. Tozer, 1991 WL 839041 (1991).
See id.
Goldman v. Hesper [1988] 3 All ER 97.
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emphasised the need to weigh competing interests through “striking [an]
appropriate balance” with respect to privileged communications.149 In a
deviation from Wigmore, he resolved that a voluntary disclosure of privileged
information would not “prevent the owner of a document from reasserting [a]
claim of privilege in any subsequent context.”150 In the year prior to Derby
being decided, Lord Taylor CJ announced in R v. Keane151 that trial judges
should carry out a balancing exercise, having regard to the weight of the
public interest in non-disclosure and to the importance of the documents to
the defence.152
This raises the question as to whether the Derby court made its judicial
pronouncement without fully considering the consequences. Lord Taylor
himself conceded that at the conclusion of trials judges may “overpitch” dicta
when “summing-up.”153 He cautioned that restraint should be exerted when
making comment on cases over which they presided154 because it was in
everyone’s interest that the administration of justice functioned well and
enjoyed the respect and confidence of the public.155 By his own admission,
Lord Taylor CJ noted that, “unfortunately, a single remark from a judge can
be picked up and is put into a litany of such remarks which is trotted every
time a new one arises.”156 This has proven true of the sweeping, albeit
fallible, pronouncement in Derby.
It is essential to note that despite the “absolutist” stance of the House
of Lords, Lord Taylor CJ called for a review of legal professional
privilege and acknowledged that the law was in an unsatisfactory
state:157 “[W]e have a system of justice, but it is marred as we all
know. In both the criminal and civil fields, we need changes to
streamline our administration and modernise its procedures.”158
However, upon declaring that the rule was absolute, with courts
proscribed from breaching it for any reason, no further review could
be undertaken.159 Speaking in May 1996 shortly before his
retirement, Lord Taylor CJ said:[i]n the last three years, almost
everything has been changed or thrown overboard in the criminal
149. Id. at 102.
150. See id.
151. R v. Keane [1994] 2 All ER 478, 485.
152. Id.
153. Peter Taylor, The Judiciary in the Nineties, 19 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 323, 329 (1993).
154. Id. at 330.
155. Id.
156. DESERT ISLAND DISCS at 10:51 (BBC Radio 4 1992).
157. Peter Taylor, Speech by the Rt. Hon the Lord Taylor of Gosforth, Lord Chief Justice of
England, at the Lord Mayor’s Dinner to HM Judges: 6 July 1994, 61 J. ARBITRATION, 1, 4-5 (1995).
158. Id. at 4-5.
159. Id. at 4-5
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justice system. When you are going to legislate, you should do it less
hectically and with a little more preparation and not have to introduce
amendments because you had not got them ready before.160
While the Derby decision “may well be expected to lead to hard cases . . .
[a]nd hard cases may cause injustice to individuals . . .,”161 Professor Coutts
applauded Lord Taylor’s precise and succinct articulation that if but one
exception were permitted to the privilege, it would destroy the rule itself and
the basis of confidence; this being and the purpose it served.162 By contrast,
Lord Hobhouse criticised the dicta of Lord Taylor when he declared, “at the
least, some and, more probably, all of these premises would benefit from
further examination.”163 It may well be regretted in hindsight that legal
professional privilege outweighs the injury that would occur if a falsely
accused person were wrongfully convicted.164
3.

Re L (A Minor)

Despite the Derby court ruling that privileged communications could not
be overridden in deference to a more compelling interest, this did not detract
from the power of the House of Lords to depart from a previous decision
where there were cogent reasons to do so. Ironically, the Derby decision was
overruled three years later in Re L.165 This decision produced cracks in the
intellectual armour of the original Derby decision and represented the
principal occasion in which the House of Lords was confronted with the
unenviable task of considering the correctness of Derby. A differently
constituted House of Lords in Re L166 was left to mop up the overeager spill
by placing some limit on the absoluteness of that earlier decision.167
There are indeed strong indications that Derby may not be good law on
this point. Derby, if correct, would have the effect of enabling all
communications, even those with dubious causal nexus, to be shielded. This
proposition was contested in Re L.168 In that case, Lord Nicholls169 opined
that the privilege may be curtailed if the interests of a minor were at stake,
with the court ultimately resolving that this constituted a legitimate public
160. Taylor, supra note 153, at 329.
161. Coutts, supra note 114, at 179.
162. Id. at 180.
163. R v. Special Comm’r, (2002) UKHL 21, at ¶ 43.
164. STEVE UGLOW, EVIDENCE: TEXT AND MATERIALS 207 (1997).
165. Re L (A Minor), (1996) 2 All ER 78, 83.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 90.
169. Id. (affirming Lord Nicholls’ absolutist stance when he maintained that legal professional
privilege was so integral to the administration of justice that only express statutory wording could abrogate
its scope or absolute application).
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interest.170 Indicating that the broad principle stated in Derby was incorrect,
Re L171 held that expert reports obtained with view to litigation were not
privileged. Rather, they were discoverable in the same way as any other
material.172
Lord Lloyd in Derby was the sole justice to acknowledge that legal
professional privilege may wring hardship on those seeking to assert their
innocence; however, he concluded that it was better to preserve the principle
fully intact for the sake of the administration of justice.173 The Derby court
ultimately resolved that client-counsel communications were, “absolutely
and permanently privileged from disclosure even though, in consequence, the
communications will not be available in court proceedings in which they
might be important evidence.”174
If one looks at the authority itself, Lord Taylor continued immediately
after that with these words:
Nobody doubts that legal professional privilege could be modified,
or even abrogated, by statute, subject always to the objection that
legal professional privilege is a fundamental human right protected
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as to which we did not hear any argument.
[The] difficulty is this: whatever inroads may have been made by
Parliament in other areas, legal professional privilege is a field which
Parliament has so far left untouched.175
Taken alone, neither of these arguments is sufficient to explain why the
privilege warrants an absolute status. Particularly when contrasted against
the collective judgments throughout the career of Lord Taylor, it becomes
apparent that he did not consider the seeking of non-legal advice or
communications as coming within the ambit of the privilege. Cautioning the
need to re-examine the scope of the rule to keep it within justifiable bounds,
his ruling in Balabel v. Air India176 introduced a rigid requirement and
restored the scope of the rule to its 19th century roots.177 This remained
consistent with the Wigmorean Paradigm in which client-counsel

170. Re L, (1996) 2 All ER at 90.
171. Id. at 83.
172. Adrian Zuckerman, Legal Professional Privilege: The Cost of Absolutism, 112 L.Q. REV. 538539 (1996).
173. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 69.
174. Id. at ¶ 74.
175. Id. at ¶ 61.
176. Balabel, (1988) Ch. at 331.
177. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶¶ 57-58.
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communications attracted legal professional privilege only if they directly
correlated to legal advice in a professional character.178
In drawing its conclusion, Derby declined to craft further exceptions to
the privilege, even if doing so could establish innocence or aid in the defence
of an accused individual.179 By broadening, without exception, the rule of
legal professional privilege, Wigmore’s articulation was invalidated and the
force of the doctrine weakened. It now usurped the central truth-finding
function of the courts and impaired the fairness and accuracy of the trial
process. In consequence of this, the balancing test was rendered obsolete and
the nature of legal professional privilege placed beyond doubt.180
4.

Three Rivers

Derby formed the theme of discussion in a later English case colloquially
known as Three Rivers.181 In that long-running dispute, the correctness of
Lord Taylor’s decision was again called into question182 during litigation
between the Bank of England and liquidators and creditors of the collapsed
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (BCCI).183 That proceeding
turned on whether the bank was compelled to furnish to the court
communications disclosed during an earlier inquiry into the collapse.184 At
trial, Tomlinson J dismissed the claimants’ request for specific disclosure
against the bank.185
On appeal in Three Rivers 1,186 Lord Justice Chadwick MR and Lord
Justice Keene upheld the judgment of Tomlinson J because the circumstances
of the case were so highly unusual in regard to the fact that the documents
were never in the physical possession of the bank, nor did the bank have a
right to possession.187 Accordingly, no obligation of disclosure existed.188
Conversely, Three Rivers 2 held that a breach of privacy was “necessary for

178. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 14, 3220-222.
179. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 69.
180. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 81, 84.
181. Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England (2003) C.P. Rep. 9 [hereinafter Three Rivers
1]; Three Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England (2002) EWHC 2309 [hereinafter Three Rivers 2]; Three
Rivers Dist. Council v. Bank of England (2003) EWCA Civ 474 [hereinafter Three Rivers 3]; Three Rivers
Dist. Council, (2004) UKHL 48 [hereinafter Three Rivers 4].
182. Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48. This case was presided over by Lord Scott, Lord Rodger,
Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown. Id.
183. Three Rivers 1, (2003) CP Rep 9.
184. Id. at ¶ 5 (noting that the inquiry was chaired by Bingham LJ, and the inquiry was known as
the “Bingham Inquiry”).
185. Id.
186. Three Rivers 1, (2003) CP Rep 9 (showing that Three Rivers 1 was heard before Lord Justice
Chadwick M.R. and Keene LJ).
187. Id. at ¶ 51.
188. Id.
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the protection of the rights and freedoms of the parties to the litigation,”189
while appeals Three Rivers 3 and Three Rivers 4 cited, with approval, the
authority of Derby when confirming that legal assistance and advice could be
effectively rendered only if clients were candid and forthcoming, this being
the very consideration which justified the absolute character of the privilege
in the first place.190
In Three Rivers 5, the House of Lords restricted the definition of “client”
when it ruled that for the purpose of legal professional privilege, information
tendered by an employee was akin to information received from an
independent agent and was not subject to protection.191 Three Rivers 6 reined
in the privilege and reduced its ambit to only those communications
pertaining to the giving or receiving of legal advice in a professional
capacity.192
Declaring that legal professional privilege “should . . . be [accorded] a
scope [which] reflects the policy reasons that justify its presence in our
law,”193 Scott and Carswell LJJ were conscious of the need to discern the
bounds of the privilege. For marginal cases, Lord Scott proposed a test for
discerning the relevant legal context in which advice attracted legal
professional privilege.194 He specifically stated that if a communication
pertained “to the rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies of the client” under
private or public law, it would be privileged.195 This was premised on the
purpose and occasion for which the communication was made.196
Citing Wigmore who emphasised that “the privilege should be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle,”197 the House of Lords concluded that it would continue to adhere
to the historical practice of English courts in limiting the ambit of the
privilege to “communications made in confidence between [lawyer and
client] for the purpose of . . . obtaining legal advice” or assistance.198
III.

PRIVILEGE: A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE

Where the House of Lords misunderstood the older English authorities
and failed to adequately survey the cases that advocated a balancing
189. Three Rivers 2, (2002) EWHC 2309 at ¶ 5 (noting the Court stated that, for this reason, Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 did not apply to the parties).
190. Three Rivers 3, (2003) EWCA Civ 474 at ¶ 116; Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶ 10.
191. Three Rivers 3, (2003) EWCA Civ 474 at ¶¶ 18, 20.
192. Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶ 38 (quoting Balabel, [1988] Ch 317).
193. Id. at ¶ 35.
194. Id. at ¶ 38.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶ 86.
198. Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶ 50.
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approach, the court was instead persuaded by a ruling stemming from AM &
S Europe Ltd. v. Commissioner of the European Communities.199 The
correlation between the ECJ case and Derby lies in the fact that AM & S
promulgated legal professional privilege to be a fundamental human right,
deserving of protection for that reason.200 The rationale expounded in AM &
S held that, irrespective of “whether it is described as [a fundamental human]
right of the client or the duty of the lawyer, [the] principle of [legal
professional privilege] has nothing to do with the protection or privilege of
the lawyer.”201 Rather, it was bound in the need for clients to turn to lawyers
for advice, aid, and legal representation.202 The Derby court, in turn, utilizes
the “fundamental human right” rationale as partial justification for rendering
the privilege absolute.203
A. AM & S Europe: A Global Community
In AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities,204
the European Court of Justice205 (hereinafter ECJ) convened to rule, for the
first time, on whether client-counsel communications were privileged under
Community Law206 from disclosure.207 In that 1983 case, the ECJ
pronounced the principle to be a fundamental human right which was
deserving of special protection for that reason.208 The facts in this case are
grounded in competition law, whereby AM & S Europe Ltd. had a subsidiaryowned zinc smelter which distributed zinc metals, alloys, and concentrates.209
Concerned about AM & S adhering to competitive conditions, three
inspectors from the Commission of the European Communities were tasked
with investigating the subsidiary’s production and distribution to ensure they
were not in violation of Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic

199. AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., (1982) E.C.R. 1575, (1983) QB 878.
200. Id. at 1600.
201. Id. at 1654.
202. Id.
203. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 61.
204. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1605 (depicting that AM & S is an abbreviation for
“Australian Mining and Smeltering”).
205. Id. at 1578 (noting the European Court of Justice comprised Menens de Wilmars, President, G.
Bosco, A. Touffait and O. Due (Presidents of Chambers), P. Pescatore, Lord Mackenzie Stuan, A.
O’Keeffe, T. Koopmans, U. Everling, A. Chloros and F. Grévisse, JJ, with Advocate General, Sir Gordon
Slynn and Registrar, A. Van Houtte).
206. Community Law, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary,
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CommunityLaw.aspx. (last visited Nov. 26, 2018)
(demonstrating that Community Law is defined, in Duhaime’s Law dictionary as: “The law of the
European Union as established by treaties and cases of the E[uropean] U[nion] courts”).
207. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1581.
208. Id. at 1600.
209. Id. at 1579.
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Community Treaty.210 Upon concluding the investigation, the inspectors “left
the [Bristol] premises of AM & S, taking with them copies of . . . documents
and leaving with AM & S a written request for further specified
documents,”211 with almost all of the communications made, or connected to,
legal opinions.212
Although AM & S furnished some documents, they refused to avail the
Commission communications which its lawyers deemed privileged213 and
directed the commission to contact its lawyers should further clarification be
required regarding the character and nature of the documents.214 AM & S
emphasised that under Community law, which was defined as part of a wider
area of international law or of the law of international organizations,215 “the
confidential relationship between lawyer and client is entitled . . . to
protection from disclosure.”216 In a subsequent meeting217 between the
appellant’s lawyers and the Commission, AM & S expressed a desire to reach
a consensus that the documents were privileged per the necessity of
upholding the secrecy of client-counsel communications.218
Notwithstanding the fact that disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise, would
suffice to waive the privilege, “AM & S was prepared to permit part of the
documents to be seen,” so as to enable their nature to be identified; with the
inspectors then able to “satisfy themselves that the [materials] were indeed
privileged.”219 The Commission inferred from this that their inspectors could
exercise their right to access and read documents in their entirety220 and
argued the extent to which documents were accorded protection was
predicated on the purpose for which discovery was sought.221 The greater the
importance in having available all of the evidence, the weaker the
protection.222
Had the ECJ ruled in favour of the respondent, “there would be no
possibility . . . of maintaining [privilege] even [over] documents of which the
protected nature is wholly [undisputed].”223 Noting that individual
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1614.
213. Id. at 1579.
214. Id.
215. RENE BARENTS, THE AUTONOMY OF COMMUNITY LAW 2 (2004).
216. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1581.
217. Id. at 1580 (noting the meeting between the lawyers representing AM & S and the Commission
“took place in Brussels on 18 September 1979”).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1584.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1582.
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circumstances informed the question of “whether compliance with
Community law is more effectively obtained by disclosure [than]
protection,”224 the ECJ sustained the appellant’s claim of legal professional
privilege on the ground that the circumstances justified the communications
as “falling within the context of the rights . . . and the lawyer’s specific duties
in that connection.”225
The ECJ held that such a privilege did exist in Community law, and that
communications were protected “beyond the Commission’s powers of
investigation” provided “they emanate from an independent [practicing]
lawyer . . . in a Member State.”226 Advocate-General, Gordon Slynn stated,
“[i]f one considers the real purpose of the protection . . . . I can for my part
see no justifiable distinction between such documents in the hands of the
lawyer and in the hands of the client.”227 Furthermore, for the purpose of
invoking the privilege and provided that the lawyer was bound by a code of
professional ethics, Slynn made no distinction between a salaried lawyer and
one engaged in private practice.228
B. Ties That Bind
The common denominator linking Derby and AM & S is that Community
Law is binding on both decisions and the courts of England could not nullify
its effect. “Community law . . . encompassed the common elements of the
Member States’ domestic laws of attorney-client privilege . . . .”229 In order
to appreciate why the ECJ imbued legal professional privilege with the status
of a “fundamental, constitutional or human right”,230 as reiterated by Lord
Taylor CJ in Derby, it is first necessary to revert to the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953231 (ECHR), which
decreed the privilege as part of the right to privacy guaranteed under Articles

224. Id. at 1584.
225. Id. at 1614.
226. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1614.
227. Id. at 1654.
228. Id. at 1646-47.
229. Jeffrey Taylor Makoff, Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Communities after A.M. &
S. v. Commission: The Secret is Out, 7 HASTINGS INT’L L. REV. 459, 463 (1984).
230. AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1600.
231. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 8, 10, Nov.
4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [Hereinafter ECHR).
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8232 and 10.233 As England was a signatory to this convention, its courts were
bound by the treaty and required to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court of Human Rights.234 According to Lord Taylor CJ, “judges . . .
appl[ied] European law without special difficulty just as they apply English
law.”235 He stated, “we have the worst of both options. Our ratification of
the Convention obliges us . . . to accept it, but our refusal to incorporate it
means acceptance only occurs after . . . much delay and humiliation”.236
In its explanatory memorandum, the ECHR stipulated that the freedoms
contained in Article 8, namely the privacy of correspondence, could be
curtailed by a public authority for the defence of a number of legitimate
aims;237 however, Article 10 acts as an adjunct to Article 8 by laying down
the freedom to receive and impart information without interference.238 This
provision is understood to imply the “freedom to seek information,” including
the exchange of communication between lawyer and client.239 Any
232. Id. at art. 8 (demonstrating that the provisions contained in Article 8(1) of the Convention
stipulate that “Everyone has the right to respect for . . . his correspondence”; and 8(2) “There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
233. Id. at art. 10 (nothing that the provision contained in Article 10(1) states: “Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression [which] shall include freedom . . . to receive and impart information . . .
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers . . . “; while 10(2) states “The exercise
of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law . . . for the prevention of . . . crime, for the
protection of . . . morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
234. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 329 (stating that Lord Taylor CJ concluded that “40 years on,
[we have] not made the Convention part of our domestic law” and “[a]lthough there is provision to refer
legal points for decision by the European Court in Luxembourg, this is rarely necessary.” He further
explained that the ECHR was complemented by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which was absorbed into
English law through statute, where after European Community Law became binding upon the courts of
England).
235. See id. at 329; AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1597-98 (noting that Article 189 confirmed
the precedence of community law over domestic legal provisions. This regulation stipulated that
community law, as an independent source of law imbued with a special and original nature, was binding
and directly applicable to all member states and carried with it a permanent restriction on their sovereign
rights, against which any act incompatible with the concept of community law could not prevail).
236. See Taylor, supra note 153, at 329.
237. European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 2018 COUNCIL EUR. ¶¶ 15-18 (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.p
df (citing ECHR, supra note 231, at art. 8) [hereinafter Guide on Article 8] (describing that pursuant to
Article 8, these legitimate aims were presupposed to mean the existence of facts or information which a
reasonable person would infer as the abuse of the privileged channel of communications. As a result,
Article 8 is not absolute and could be overridden when society “in the interests national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
238. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No.R (97) 18 and Explanatory Memorandum, 1997
COUNCIL EUR. 1, , (1997), https://rm.coe.int/16806846ca.
239. Id.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

23

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4

176

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

interference with client-counsel communications is therefore said to
contravene the treaty, except in defence of a number of legitimate aims. An
inference may be made that the types of communications passing between
clients and lawyers, whatever their purpose, were of a private and confidential
nature.240 Nevertheless, the ECHR was prepared to balance competing
interests and did not declare legal professional privilege to be an absolute
right.241 Contrary to the conclusion reached in Derby, the ECHR implied that
a balancing test should apply242 such that the privilege could be derogated
from with reasonable cause where “such interference is proportionate and in
furtherance of other legitimate aims”.243 This raises the question as to
whether the all-or-nothing approach taken by the House of Lords may be
subject to challenge.
C. Absolutism: A Rebuttable Presumption
The fallibility of the Derby court’s sweeping pronouncement is evident
on a number of levels and for a number of reasons. This article already
documented two of three planks where Derby fell short; specifically, Derby
misunderstanding the historical authorities, and later, hanging its hat on the
ECJ ruling in AM & S as a means of fusing “fundamental human rights” with
an “absoluteness rationale.” The third plank where Derby failed was in its
correlation between legal professional privilege and express statutory
authority.
The premise that legal professional privilege is absolute and cannot be
breached by any court for any reason is premised on faulty logic and
overlooks the common law decision of Re L,244 in which the rule yielded, in
exceptional circumstances, to the interests of a minor.245 Furthermore, it runs
contrary to remarks made by Lord Taylor CJ in Derby, wherein he proceeded
to state, “[n]obody doubts that [the rule] could be . . . abrogated, by statue . .
. .”246 As a creature of common law, the privilege does not derive its
authority from statute. Moreover, parliament is not presumed to intend to
intrude on the common law, but will adopt a statutory construction which
preserves, rather than interferes with, its operation owing to the fact that the
privilege is now understood to represent a fundamental human right

240. See Guide on Article 8, supra note 237, at ¶ 419.
241. Richard S. Pike, The English Law of Legal Professional Privilege: A Guide for American
Attorneys, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 51, 55-56 (2006).
242. Id. at 56.
243. Id.
244. Re L (a minor), [1998] 51 BMLR 137, 140.
245. Id.
246. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 61.
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underpinned by the public interest in availing clients the right to access legal
representation.247
Lord Taylor CJ subsequently resolved that parliament had left the realm
of legal professional privilege untouched.248 This in incorrect. By the time
Derby came before the House of Lords in 1995, a number of English statutes
expressly overrode the rule.249 One of these, the Criminal Justice Act 1988
(UK), provided at sections 93A and 93B250 that no privilege could be
maintained in instances where a party had assisted another to make or retain
benefits through criminal conduct or the proceeds of crime.251 Given that a
judge, in upholding this legislation would be required to satisfy himself or
herself as to whether the privilege had either been made out or vitiated by
virtue of crime, a balancing exercise would have to occur to determine which
interest should prevail.252
Where AM & S and Derby viewed legal professional privilege as a vital
principle, the judgment has been sharply criticized. Edward Imwinkelried
stated that, “[some commentators] have [called] for Parliament to overrule
the decision and declare that even [a] purportedly absolute privileges must
yield in extreme cases.”253 Further, A.A.S Zuckerman expressed his hope
that “the absolutist approach to legal professional privilege . . . [would] be
short-lived” because “a discretionary jurisdiction offers a better solution . . .
.”254
A balancing of conflicting interests to straighten out “confused areas of
the law which give rise to constant litigation, inconsistent decisions and
perhaps even plain wrong decisions”255 would prevent interference with the
administration of justice.256
As the public interest in the proper
administration of justice should prevail over all else, judges should be
accorded a discretionary power to examine the privileged communications,
together with a statement supporting the reasons for non-disclosure, and
decide on that basis whether or not the material should be produced.257
247. Francis Cardell-Oliver, Parliament, The Judiciary and Fundamental Rights: The Strength of
the Principle of Legality, 41 MELB. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (2017); See Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48, ¶ 28.
248. Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 61.
249. See Criminal Justice Act 1988, c. 33 §§ 93A, 93B (Eng.) (repealed on Feb. 24, 2003).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean
Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 174-75 (citing Dennis, supra
note 37, at 327-30).
254. A.A.S. Zuckerman, Note, Legal Professional Privilege – The Cost of Absolutism, 112 L. Q.
REV. 535, 539 (1996).
255. CHRISTOPHER ALAN DE COURCY RYDER, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONAL
PRIVILEGE, 28 (1990).
256. Harry Street, State Secrets - A Comparative Study, 14 Mod. L. Rev. 121, 134-35 (1951).
257. Id.
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The need to depart from the current concept of privilege and develop a
rationale which promotes judicial discretion is supported by Thorpe J, who
advocated an alternate rationale when confirming his desire to see the
common law plainly stipulate that lawyers in possession of confidential
communications “relevant to determination but contrary to the interests of
their client . . . [be] unable to resist disclosure by reliance on legal
professional privilege, but have a positive duty to disclose to the other parties
and to the court.”258
This view is reinforced by commentary from academics, including
Charles Hollander QC. In Documentary Evidence, he claimed that the right
to a fair trial is an obvious right which is hampered when information that
can prove innocence or aid in a defence of an accused is omitted from
evidence.259 The right of every accused to a fair trial is a basic and
fundamental right.260 He added, “[t]he law of legal professional privilege is
an area which has to adapt . . . .”261
Commentator Harry Street denied that there was any justification for the
assumption that legal professional privilege overrode all other considerations
and petitioned for judges to be empowered in deciding whether disclosure of
communications “would be injurious to the public interest.”262 Colin
Passmore similarly commented that the Derby decision raises a few questions
in terms of whether the defendant, Brooks, ought to have been given recourse
to Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998263 to challenge the House of Lords’
ruling on the ground that the unavailability of A’s communications deprived
him of due process and the right to a fair trial.264
This accorded with the view adopted by Adam Dodek that
the legal system should not regard the privilege as absolute, but apply it

258. Essex Cty Council v. R (1994) Fam. 167, 168-69 [1993].
259. CHARLES HOLLANDER & TOM ADAM, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 131 (7th ed. 2000).
260. ECHR, supra note 231, at art. 6.
261. Charles Hollander, The Legal Spotlight: A Question of Privilege, FUNDING IN FOCUS: CONTENT
SERIES, May 2015, at 10.
262. Street, supra note 256, at 134.
263. The Nat’l Council for Civil Liberties, A Parliamentarian’s Guide to the Human Rights Act,
2010 Liberty 1, 27 (2010), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ed640552.pdf. Explaining that:
[t]he right to a fair trial is fundamental to the rule of law and to democracy itself. The right
applies to both criminal and civil cases, although certain specific minimum rights set out in
Article 6 apply only in criminal cases. The right to a fair trial is absolute and cannot be limited.
It requires a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. The procedural requirements of a fair hearing might differ
according to the circumstances of the accused.
Id.
264. Colin Passmore, The Future of Legal Professional Privilege, 3 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF
71, 73-74 (1999).

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/4

26

Ljubanovic: Absolute Privilege: A Legal Fiction

2019]

ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: A LEGAL FICTION

179

“more as a matter of case-by-case balancing.”265 In fact, if dual rationales
existed in judicial decision-making with respect to legal professional
privilege, “the process of that decision making would be [significantly]
improved.”266 By contrast, Professor Johannes Chan contended that it was
“not open to the court to conduct any further balancing exercise between
[legal professional privilege] and other public interests,” and Lord Taylor’s
depiction of the rule as an “absolute right” simply inferred that, as a matter
of common law, it could not be overridden by a greater public interest.267
The sum of these remarks indicates that litigation cannot be correctly
concluded without a fair trial, yet a fair trial cannot be guaranteed when
potentially spurious claims to legal professional privilege are freely asserted.
By permitting exculpatory or decisive evidence relevant to the establishment
of a party’s defence or claim of innocence to be withheld from the court, it is
foreseeable that grave injustices may result. For this reason, Wigmore
propounded that when justice required the investigation of the truth, no man
could declare he had any knowledge which was rightly private.268
This view accorded with developments in the Commonwealth
jurisdictions of Canada and Australia. Contrasting the Derby approach with
the approach earlier taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in Descôteaux v.
Mierzwinski,269 Chan observed that the Canadian court rejected the approach
adopted by the House of Lords and instead subjected legal professional
privilege to the same balancing test as any other fundamental constitutional
right.270 Professor Gavin Murphy added that the House of Lords’ inflexibility
is out of sync with the right to a fair trial.271 Similarly, in the Australian case
of Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore, Hale, Davey & Leake,272 the High
Court of Australia specifically referenced Barton,273 National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children274 and Ataou.275 That court ruled that there
was a legitimate argument to be made that, as a matter of policy, legal
professional privilege should be relinquished in any case, but particularly a
criminal one when the considerations favouring disclosure of confidential
265. Adam M. Dodek, Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 493, 526 (2010).
266. Ryder, supra note 255, at 28.
267. Johannes Chan, Legal Professional Privilege: Is it Absolute?, 36 HONG KONG L.J. 461, 465
(2006).
268. Wigmore & McNaughton, supra note 78, at 72.
269. See Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, 1982 1 R.C.S. 860, 875 (Can.).
270. Chan, supra note 268, at 470, 471-42.
271. Gavin Murphy, The Innocence at Stake Test and Legal Professional Privilege: A Logical
Progression for the Law . . . But Not in England, 2001 CRIM. L. REV. 728, 730 (2001).
272. Carter v. Managing Partner, Northmore, Hale, Davey, & Leake (1995) 129 ALR 593, ¶¶ 9-10.
273. Barton, [1972] 2 All ER 1192.
274. House of Lords v. Nat’l Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, (1978) AC 171 (HL)
(Eng.).
275. Ataou, [1988] QB 798.
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communications outweighed
confidentiality.276
VI.

those

favouring

the

[Vol. 45

preservation

of

CONCLUSION

Judicial rulings surrounding the application of legal professional
privilege have been fraught with doubt, fluctuating from one conclusion to
another as judges in Commonwealth jurisdictions seek to reconcile this
tension.277 Even Lord Taylor CJ, in his rulings preceding Derby, did not
recognise the supremacy of legal professional privilege.278 Only when the
House of Lords distinguished Derby from cases which had previously stood
for decades as good authority, was the rule resolved in favour of nondisclosure.279 Reversing the priorities of the innocence at stake when it
overruled both Barton and Ataou, the House of Lords confirmed the
substantive dimension of legal professional privilege such that no exception
should be allowed.280
This was clearly a change from treating legal professional privilege as a
rule of admissibility (which was the view a generation ago), to the modern
view, initially taken in Australia in Baker and subsequently in England. The
Lords’ sole justification for elevating legal professional privilege into
something resembling a constitutional principle,281 was grounded in a
questionable belief that the courts of England remained bound by public
policy considerations that had prevailed centuries earlier.282 Representing a
paradigm shift from the fundamental concepts that had historically guided
legal professional privilege, it was extraordinary that the Derby court should
abolish an exception to the privilege that Caulfield and French JJ recognized
as a matter of natural justice.283
With Derby now conferring an absolute immunity from disclosure, the
major consideration behind the House of Lords’ formulation lay, first in the
erroneous Wigmorean pronouncement with respect to the origins of legal

276. Carter, 129 ALR at ¶ 14.
277. See Barton, [1972] 2 All ER at 1194 (holding that there is an exception to privilege, “[i]f there
are documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on production, help to further the defence
of an accused man, then in my judgment no privilege attaches.”); but see Carter, 129 ALR at ¶ 10 (holding
against an exception to privilege, “[b]ut if the purpose of the privilege is to facilitate the application of the
rule of law in the public interest, it is not possible to allow the interest of an individual accused to destroy
the privilege which is conferred to advance that public interest.”).
278. See Keane, [1994] 2 All ER at 485 (holding that judges need to balance the interests to
determine privilege).
279. See Baker, 153 CLR at 95.
280. Dennis, supra note 37, at 329.
281. See Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶¶ 24-25, 28.
282. Dennis, supra note 37, at 330.
283. Id.
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professional privilege,284 and second in a ruling stemming from AM & S
Europe Ltd. v. Commissioner of the European Communities.285
This facilitates the making of an important distinction, whereby, neither
the European Court of Justice in AM & S nor the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953 pronounced legal
professional privilege as above reproach.286 Accordingly, the reliance on, or
misinterpretation of, Wigmore and AM & S led Lord Taylor CJ into error,
whereby he overlooked or disregarded the fact that these authorities were
prepared to balance competing interests, such that the privilege could be
derogated from with reasonable cause and in defence of legitimate aims.287
No decisive answer exists as to why Lord Taylor CJ refrained from applying
AM & S in his earlier judgments, all of which occurred after the European
Court of Justice ruling. There is no clear reasoning as to why he elected to
follow it only in Derby.
In the modern English context, legal professional privilege was elevated
to the realm of ‘fundamental human right’ when the European Court of
Human Rights affirmed that it could be departed from only in exceptional
circumstances.288 The House of Lords endorsed this expansive approach
when it favoured the paramountcy of the doctrine and placed its status beyond
doubt. Assigning it an absoluteness from which there was no derogation, it
extended further than necessary to enable clients to obtain legal advice.
Derby’s rigid and unyielding application of legal professional privilege
is out of step with the general interpretation of the privilege and strips the
ideals of the privilege of much of its meaning by ceasing to avail any degree
of flexibility or judicial discretion. At its core, Derby illuminates what courts
are prepared to put into, or read into, the concept of legal professional
privilege. By freezing the law of privilege at this particular point in history,
Derby prevented legal professional privilege from evolving and adapting
according to judicial discretion.
Where the prevailing orthodoxy holds that legal professional privilege is
absolute, this article has drawn a correlation between the falsity of this notion
and the inescapable influences of Bentham and Wigmore who argued against
this overriding protection. Having exposed the reality that the primacy of
legal professional privilege is starting to erode, this article concludes that
Lord Taylor’s conception of legal professional privilege was inherently
flawed and without intrinsic justification as to why it should prevail if
counter-indicative to reason. The absoluteness of privilege is anti-ethical to
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 31.
AM & S Eur. Ltd., (1982) E.C.R. at 1601.
See id. at 1655-56.
Derby, (1996) AC 487 at ¶ 65.
See Three Rivers 4, (2004) UKHL 48 at ¶ 28.
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a system which purports to have as its end rational decision-making. After
all, justice does not exist in the microcosm of a courtroom. The keystone of
legal reasoning and “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”289

289. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolf Howe, ed., 15th ed. 1963).
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